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This means it is possible to use mathematical induction to derive qualitative properties of the derivatives, and of ten this is enough to establish qualitative comparative statics properties of the model.
The model of job search we present is designed with the empirical analysis of the sources of variation across individuals in unemployment duration in mind. 1 It is very close to the two-state model presented in lPreliminary empirical results based on this model are presented in Albrecht, Holmlund, and Lang (1989) . The objective of our empirical work is to disentangle the roles of "choice" and "chance" in determining individual unemployment durations (Mortensen and Neumann (1984». That is, can longer durations be understood primarily in terms of job search behavior (low search intensity and/or high reservation wage) or are exogenous environmental conditions (an unfavorable offer arrival rate and/or wage offer distribution) more to blame? And, to the extent that variations in job search behavior explain variation in unemployment duration, what factors determine the choice of search effort and a reservation wage? 2 Burdett and Mortensen (1978), a remarkable paper, which has something of the status of a neglected classic. The results presented in their paper are important, but it seems fair to say that the difficulty of the methods they used to derive their results has deterred those interested in this area.
Relative to the techniques used in Burdett and Mortensen, our comparative statics methodology allows straightforward and unified derivations.
The organization of our paper is as follows. In the next section we state and prove our comparative statics result on the differentiability of contraction mappings and explain how to apply this result. In Section 3 we present our model of job search, and in Section 4 we illustrate the use of our differentiability result to deduce the qualitative comparative statics properties of the model. In the final section we conclude.
Comparative Statics in Dynamie Programming Models v(x)
Consider a dynamie programming problem of the form:
where v is the "value function," s a vector of choice parameters belonging to n some compact subset K(x) of R , 8 a parameter vector, and T(s,8,') a contraction mapping with modulus fi < l taking bounded, continuous functions of x into new bounded, continuous functions of x. These conditions ensure the existence of a unique solution v, and we assume that T is increasing in v so that the maximization maximizes v (Bellman's Principle).
For comparative statics analysis, the differentiability properties of (l) are of interest. Proposition l below states that the value function v is differentiable with respect to the exogenous parameters 8. Further, the 3 differentiated function is itself the fixed point of a contraction mapping.
This last fact is very useful for deriving comparative statics properties of the derivative ve: Proposition 2 below shows how this fact can be used.
Proposition l: Assume that the mapping T is continuously differentiable with respect to e and V,2 that the compact-valued correspondence K(x) is continuous, and that the maximization problem in (l) has a unique solution To prove Proposition l we use the following lemma:
Lemma: Assume that no choice parameter s is present, so that we consider the equation v(x) = T(e,v)(x). n->eo n = T(f ). Let P be some propert y that is preserved by T P implies fn+l = T(fn) has propert y P) and also preserved the unique solution g = T(g) also has the propert y P.
By Proposition l, the derivative of the value function with respect to the exogenous parameters is the contraction mapping * *
By Proposition 2, properties of Vo can be established inductively. That is, if one wants to show that Vo has some propert y P, then it suffices to show that 5 o some Vo has propert y P and that propert y P is preserved by the right-hand side of (2) and in the limit. Note, incidentally, that Proposition l does not follow from Proposition 2 since differentiability is a propert y that need not be preserved in the limit.
The idea that something like Propositions l and 2 might be used for comparative statics analysis in dynamic optimization problems has some precedent in the literature. Mortensen (1986, p. 875) uses Proposition 2 to inductively establish a propert y of the derivative of a value function with respect to an exogenous parameter. 3 He recognizes that if V can be differentiated with respect to O, then at least some such derivatives are themselves fixed points of contraction mappings. What Proposition l establishes is that such differentiation is "always" legitimate and that "all" such derivatives are fixed points.
Our result is also related to Araujo and Scheinkman (1977) , the standard comparative dynamics reference in the optimal growth literature. Using a calculus of variations set-up, Araujo and Scheinkman provide sufficient conditions for the differentiability of the policy function with respect to the exogenous parameters of the problem. That is, in the notation of our equation (l), they provide sufficient conditions for the differentiability of s with respect to O. The difficulty is that it does not seem possible to check these sufficient conditions (the "dominant diagonal" conditions of their Assumption 2, p. 608) in problems that cannot be easily fit into the calculus of variations framework. Araujo and Scheinkman's dominant diagonal conditions are required to ensure that the implicit function theorem can be applied in an infinite-dimensional setting. Likewise, the key to the proof of our 3We thank Dale Mortensen for alerting us to this reference. 6 Proposition l is also the use of the implicit function theorem in infinitedimensional spaces. The virtue to the dynamic programming formulation of the optimization problem is that the applicability of the implicit function theorem falls out immediately.
In the next two sections we present our model of job search and apply our comparative statics methodology. In these sections we focus on the model as an object of interest in its own right; however, in concluding this "methodological" section we want to make clear that the techniques we will use are certainly not limited to models of job search. Propositions l and 2 are applicable to any optimization problem that can be formula ted as a dynamic program, optimal growth and stochastic dynamic macroeconomics included.
3.The Model of Job Search
We consider an individual who at any instant is either employed (e) or not employed (n). This individual derives utility from the rates at which he or she consumes (c) and enjoys leisure (i) with a concave instantaneous utility indicator u(c,i); that is, the utility enjoyed over an interval of The individual's objective is to maximize expected lifetime utility discounted over the infinite horizon by ehoosing search intensities and an acceptance rule for job offers. This decision problem will be characterized by two value functions -V(w), the value (ie, expected discounted lifetime utility) of being employed at wage w, and U, the value of non-employment. We begin by developing expressions for these values conditionaI on any given search intensities and acceptance rules.
For an interval of time of length ~t the value function for an individual employed at wage w and searching with intensity s is e l V(w) = l+p~t{ u(wh+y,l-h-se)~t + ae(se)~tEmax[V(w'),V(w)]
e e
The analogous value of non-employment, conditionaI on a search intensity sn' is In both expressions the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of the prospective new wage offer, w', and the acceptance rule is presumed to be optimal relative to the given search intensities, s and s .
e n 9 The interpretation of (3) is as follows. The "instantaneous utility" of being employed at wage w is proportional to the length ~t of the time interval. With probability a (s )~t a new job offer will be reeeived, and that e e offer will be aeeepted if the value of the new job exeeeds that of the eurrent job. This refleets the assumption that the aeeeptanee rule is optimal relative to the given s . With probability 16t a separation will oeeur with the e associated value U. With probability l -(a (s )+1)~t the worker will neither e e reeeive a new offer nor lose his eurrent job. In this case he or she retains the value V(w). The remainder term o(~t) reflects the assumptions that as 6t ~ O any non-proportionality of utility to the length of the time interval goes to zero at an even faster rate. Likewise, the probability of receiving more than one job offer or more than one separation-indueing shock goes to zero at an even faster rate. Finally, all of the above is discounted at the l rate l+p~t' The interpretation of (4) is analogous.
It is easier to treat the individual's deeision problem in continuous time. Re-arranging, dividing through by 6t, and taking limits as ~t ~ O gives
p n n n n n (6) It is eonvenient to re-write these equation Equations (7) and (8) 
Bellman's Princip1e ensures that equations (9) and (10) define both the va1ue functions V(w) and U and the "strategies" (s* = s*(w) and s* plus the e e n corresponding optimal acceptance ru1e) that maximize V(w) and U.4
Since equations (9) and (10) define a contraction mapping, we can use Proposition 2 to estab1ish that V(w) is increasing in w. Regarding U as fixed, equation (9) is a contraction mapping for V(w). The Banach space is that of continuous functions defined on [!,wl and normed by Ilfll = sup_lf(w)l. Thus, w~w~w the optimal acceptance ru1e for an emp10yed worker is simp1y to take any job 4The resu1ts of Sharma (1987) cou1d a1so be used to show that (9) and (10) define a contraction mapping.
11 offering a higher wage. Likewise, the optimal acceptance rule for an individual without a job is a simple reservation wage rule: Accept any job offering a wage w iff w ~ r, where the reservation wage r is defined by
This allows us to re-write the value functions once again, this time in a way that is useful for deriving the necessary conditions for the optimal search intensities and reservation wage: such that the marginal utility of leisure is equated to the expected gain from search at the margin. The second-order condition (given s* > O) is that the e LHS of (13) be decreasing in s . The concavity of u and of o ensure that this e e will always be satisfied.
An individual without a job chooses both a search intensity and a reservation wage. From (12) the first-order conditions for the optimal off-the-job search intensity, s~, and reservation wage, r*, are
An individua1 without a job, if he or she searches at all, again does so to equate the marginal uti1ity of 1eisure to the expected gain from search at the margin. The reservation wage is chosen to equate the va1ue of the marginal job with the va1ue of unemp10yment. The second-order condition for s* is ensured n by the concavity of u and of a , and the second-order condition for r* is n ensured by the fact that V(w) is increasing in w. (14) hold as equalities.
13
To carry out a comparative statics analysis we need to take into account that the first-order conditions involve not on ly the endogenous variables and the exogenous parameters but also the value functions. In considering the effect of a variation in an exogenous parameter account needs to be taken of both the direct effect of the parameter ch ange and the indirect effect via the change in the value functions.
Propositions l and 2 handle this complication. We illustrate the idea by working through the comparative statics of an improvement in the wage offer 8s* distribution on s*. We now show e O.
--> Table l; the calculations   15 themselves are available from the authors on request. We are able to sign 27 out of the 28 effects using our qualitative comparative statics methodology.
[ Table l goes about here] The comparative statics results presented in Table l have straightforward interpretations. For example, individuals with high values of ~, ie, those who can expect short employment durations, will search less intensely, both onand off-the-job, but will be less selective about which wage offers to accept, than will otherwise equivalent individuals with low values of ~. Note that the effect of an increase in ~ on expected duration in non-employment is ambiguous since the hazard from non-employment to employment is a (s*)[l-F(r*)] and a n n ch ange in ~ affects s* and r* in the same direction. The effects of an n improvement in the wage offer distribution and of an increase in the marginal efficiency of search while non-employed are similarly ambiguous. The net effects of these changes must be determined by the data. [ Table 2 goes about here] The specification they used for their comparative statics analysis differs from ours in three ways. First, they assumed the search technology to be the same in both states and the average and marginal efficiencies of search to be identical; ie, Burdett and Mortensen assumed a (s) = a (s) = as. They gave e n comparative statics results for "an improvement in the worker's labor market"; in This technique should find useful application in models of job search, optimal growth, stochastic dynamic macroeconomics, etc.
We illustrated our comparative statics methodology with an application to a model of job search. The model is a variant of one developed by Burdett and Mortensen (1978) , and our second contribution has been to rederive their results in a unified methodological framework. From the point of view of empirical analysis, an important moral of both our analysis and that of Burdett and Mortensen is that models of individual job search that treat the reservation wage as the only decision variable are likely to be misleading.
Changes in the labor market environment that have unambiguous effects on the 17 reservation wage of ten have offsetting effects on search intensity. Dur comparative statics methodo1ogy has allowed us to i11ustrate this point in a straightforward fashion. ---------------------------------------- 
